海外并购: 政治归属，基于“一带一路”倡议的公平性

FEROZE Nazia; CHENG Tongshun; FAROOQ Muhammad Sabil; YUAN Tongkai

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1000-5641.202092104

海外并购: 政治归属，基于“一带一路”倡议的公平性

doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1000-5641.202092104

1.
南开大学周恩来政府管理学院政治学系，天津　300071，中国
2.
南开大学周恩来政府管理学院社会学系，天津　300071，中国

详细信息

中图分类号: D033
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- 文章访问数: 73
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- 被引次数: 0
出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2020-04-21
- 网络出版日期: 2021-01-27
- 刊出日期: 2021-01-27

Overseas mergers and acquisitions: Political affiliation and equitable nature based on Belt and Road Initiative

1.
Department of Political Science, Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University, Tianjin　300071, China
2.
Department of Sociology, Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University, Tianjin　300071, China

More Information

Corresponding author: sabilfarooq@hotmail.com

摘要

摘要: 以“一带一路”倡议为研究视角，选择2009年至2017年中国上市公司的海外并购作为研究样本，探究其权力的性质、政治联系及其对海外并购的影响. 研究表明，政治并没有加强企业“一带一路”倡议的并购意愿，但会影响并购交易的规模. 国有股的性质对收购意愿和并购规模没有重大影响. “一带一路”沿线的海外并购中，政治关联企业的海外并购规模大于非政治关联企业的海外并购规模，政治联系的深度和广度与并购规模呈正相关. 中国企业可以通过“一带一路”倡议的实施来促进海外并购，同时注重企业自身的经济利益，实现国家、市场和企业的多赢.
- “一带一路”倡议 /
- 海外并购 /
- 政治联系 /
- 公平性
- Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) /
- overseas mergers and acquisitions /
- political connection /
- equitable nature

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Tab. 1 Descriptive statistics of variables

Variable name	Variable symbol	#samples	Average	Stnd. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
“Belt and Road”	BR	347	0.1354	0.3427	0	1
Political Connection	Political	347	0.8329	0.3736	0	1
Political connection breadth	Polwidth	347	0.1551	0.1242	0	0.5
Political relevance depth	Poldepth	347	1.6455	2.2446	0	2
Nature of the company	State	347	0.3333	0.4721	0	1
M&A asset size	Firmsize	347	22.6924	1.6998	20.0696	28.1356
Cash flow	OCF	347	0.0532	0.0747	–0.2148	0.2758
Asset-liability ratio leverage	Lever	347	0.4429	0.2024	0.0203	0.8768
Return on equity	ROE	347	0.1047	0.0896	–0.1603	0.3394
Income growth rate	Growh	347	0.2509	0.5827	–0.6085	3.6403
M&A transaction size	MAsize	347	0.0660	0.2328	0.0001	1.7059
Transaction payment method	Paymethod	347	0.9510	0.2162	0	1
Inter-bank acquisition	Horizontal	347	0.4640	0.4994	0	1

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Tab. 2 Logit regression analysis of overseas mergers and acquisitions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Political		0.1448(0.774)	–0.1731(0.912)		0.0645(0.901)
Polwidth				0.0596(0.810)
Poldepth					0.1501(0.737)
State×Political		–0.0971(0.825)	–0.0591(0.895)	–0.0955(0.829)
State
Firmsize	0.0856(0.455)	0.0970(0.446)	0.1018(0.433)	0.0974(0.444)	0.0642(0.612)
OCF	–0.5310(0.840)	–0.5051(0.850)	–0.5544(0.835)	–0.4960(0.853)	–0.6634(0.803)
Leverage	1.4619(0.142)	1.4881(0.138)	1.4564(0.149)	1.4853(0.139)	1.4231(0.158)
ROE	–1.4210(0.518)	–1.6487(0.469)	–1.5897(0.485)	–1.6435(0.471)	–1.2556(0.578)
Growth	0.3918(0.110)	0.3907(0.112)	0.3878(0.116)	0.3926(0.111)	0.3863(0.115)
MAsize	4.1701(0.000)	4.1502(0.000)	4.1878(0.000)	4.1536(0.000)	4.1244(0.000)
Aymethod	0.3924(0.635)	0.3424(0.686)	0.4143(0.622)	0.3521(0.677)	0.3449(0.684)
Horizontal	0.2937(0.414)	0.3155(0.385)	0.3217(0.377)	0.3178(0.382)	0.2780(0.442)
Constant term	–5.3198(0.042)	–5.6137(0.048)	–5.6494(0.050)	–5.6099(0.048)	–4.8726(0.091)
Number of samples	347	347	347	347	347
PseudoR²	0.1492	0.1499	0.1497	0.1499	0.1498
Note: Represent significant levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; the values in parentheses are regression p-values (The following tables are the same)

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Tab. 3 Multiple regression analysis of the scale of M&A transactions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
BR	0.2217	0.2227	0.2216	0.0684	0.1369	0.0527
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.408)	(0.005)	(0.509)
	0.0656
Political	(0.024)
Political		0.2249
Polwidth		(0.016)
			0.0336
Poldepth			(0.019)
Poldepth				0.1835
				(0.033)
					0.5494
BR×Polwidth					(0.016)
BR×Polwidth						0.1011
BR×Poldepth						(0.019)
State	–0.0011	–0.0071	–0.0030	–0.0038	–0.0014	–0.0024
	(0.967)	(0.799)	(0.911)	(0.888)	(0.957)	(0.927)
	–0.0254	–0.0281	–0.0253	–0.0255	–0.0239	–0.0256
Firmsize	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
OCF	0.2355	0.2294	0.2454	0.2706	0.2441	0.2769
	(0.165)	(0.175)	(0.148)	(0.114)	(0.150)	(0.105)
	–0.0236	–0.0162	–0.0232	–0.0202	–0.0279	–0.0194
Leverage	(0.699)	(0.791)	(0.703)	(0.739)	(0.647)	(0.751)
Leverage	–0.1583	–0.1697	–0.1615	–0.1675	–0.1730	–0.1663
ROE	(0.272)	(0.240)	(0.263)	(0.229)	(0.231)	(0.249)
ROE	–0.0245	–0.0222	–0.0236	–0.0268	–0.0247	–0.0268
Growh	(0.189)	(0.235)	(0.208)	(0.151)	(0.185)	(0.152)
Growh	–0.4100	–0.4061	–0.4098	–0.3860	–0.3926	–0.3839
Paymethod	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Paymethod	–0.0008	–0.0005	–0.0005	–0.0026	–0.0031	0.0026
Horizontal	(0.968)	(0.981)	(0.981)	(0.900)	(0.884)	(0.902)
Constant term	0.9700	1.0466	0.9661	0.9844	0.9782	1.0012
Constant term	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Number of samples	347	347	347	347	347	347
Pseudo R2	0.3174	0.3189	0.3379	0.3354	0.3385	0.3380

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